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ABSTRACT
The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC was adopted by the European Union (EU) as a
means toward harmonization of the value-added tax (VAT) system. The Framers of Directive
77/388/EEC believed that a disjointed VAT tax system that existed previously was harmful to
the common market’s guarantee of free movement of goods and services that are subject to the
VAT tax. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the subject of the Sixth
Council Directive 77/388/EEC reflects four dominant patterns, including the limitation of
member-states to dictate the parameters of the VAT tax, that additional administrative measures
cannot be adopted by member-states, that variations among member-states will only be tolerated
if no threat to harmonization exists, and that the ECJ will draft opinions that promote efficiency
in trade and combat tax avoidance. Problematically, the ECJ’s allowing for too much discretion
for member-state legislatures and national courts in conjunction with the use of a Directive to
legislatively push for harmonization have left the EU with serious threats to a VAT tax system
1*
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that can be best described as fragile. If left in this fragile state, the level of harmonization that
has been achieved could be in jeopardy.

I. INTRODUCTION
A U.S. firm engaged in the scope of international business must consider the implications
of the world’s VAT tax system.2 More specific to the European continent, one of the most
significant challenges to a business operating in the European Union (“EU”) is the ability to
comply with 28 different tax administrations – one for each EU member-state.3 Despite these
challenges, the EU’s common market has been so enticing that many American firms have
moved their factory operations to the EU in order to make and sell their goods within the EU
without restrictions that would otherwise be associated with exported goods coming into the
EU.4 The EU constitutes a common market that requires the free movement of goods, services,
capital, and labor.5 The EU’s common market also requires the reduction of non-tariff barriers
as well as the harmonization of law across the member-states.6
One of the purposes of EU law is to address the various problems associated with a 28member union through a body of transnational law.7 One of the chief responsibilities of the
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) is to ensure that the 28 member-states observe the EU
Treaties, Regulations, and Directives that constitute the corpus of EU law. 8 The ECJ, through its
judgments, has engaged in high levels of judicial activism in order to further harmonize the
common market’s principles across the EU’s member-states.9 Regardless of the mission of the
ECJ, there exists a belief that the EU member-states are losing the ability to combat tax
avoidance due to the ECJ’s jurisprudence, which, according to the criticism, actually makes tax
avoidance easier.10
Globalization has threatened the tax bases of national governments in such a way that the
international tax community is mired in a debate on tax avoidance and the proper associated
responsibilities for both multinational corporations and governments.11 Tax avoidance,
2

ALAN SCHENK, VICTOR THURONYI, & WEI CUI, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 1 (2nd

ed. 2015).
3

BEN J. M. TERRA & PETER J. WATTEL, EUROPEAN TAX LAW 3 (6th ed. 2012).

4

TONY CLEAVER, UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD ECONOMY 121-122 (4th ed. 2013).

5

Id. at 78.

6

Id.

7

DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 2 (2nd ed. 2010).

8

Id. at 143.

9

MICHELLE CINI & NIEVES PEREZ-SOLORZANO BORRAGAN, EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 257 (4th ed. 2013).

10

Lilian V. Faulhaber, Sovereignty, Integration, and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the
Proper Balance, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, at 179 (2010).
11

CHRISTIANA HJI PANAYI, EUROPEAN UNION CORPORATE TAX LAW 4 (2013).
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regardless of the form of tax being avoided, creates two negative realities, including a greater
disrespect for taxing authorities and the reduction of revenue whereby the various member-state
governments cannot reinvest in their populations.12 One estimate is that the avoidance of valueadded tax (“VAT tax”) alone costs the EU €100 billion each year. 13 The EU Commission has
become more aggressive as of late in clamping down on illegal tax breaks and other forms of tax
avoidance especially in cases that lead to distortion of competition within the EU common
market.14 The EU Commission has gone as far as to find entire member-state tax regimes to be
illegal as they drain the EU of revenue.15 Some of the world’s largest multinational firms are
facing the threat of paying significant amounts in back taxes.16 Just recently, the European
Commission commanded that the Apple Corporation pay the Irish government €13 billion in
back taxes excused as the result of a tax agreement between Apple and Ireland, which the
European Commission found to be a violation of EU rules on state aid.17 More specific to the
VAT tax avoidance problem in Europe, the EU Commission has attempted to gain information
from the 28 member-states on the amount of VAT tax avoidance, but to date, only two memberstates have responded to the information request.18 For countries that are members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OCED”), a group of countries for
which many EU member-states belong, along with the United States, tax avoidance rates are
roughly the same.19 Regardless of the international attention paid to tax avoidance, there is some
debate as to whether member-states within the EU have a duty to combat those entities that seek
to avoid the payment of taxes.20
Across the Atlantic, the United States government is concerned that the EU
Commission’s attempts at finding tax avoidance are unfairly targeting American-based firms.21
There exists a bit of a divide between the U.S. and its trading partners on the issue of the VAT
tax. The EU, in its attempts to define the scope of the VAT tax within its jurisdiction, has
deemed the virtual currency Bitcoin to be subject to its VAT tax system, which applies to the
12

Faulhaber, supra note 10, at 207.

13

VAT Fraud in the European Union: A Tax Net Full of Holes, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/6923936.
14
Tom Fairless, EU Orders Belgium to Recover Unpaid Taxes From 35 Firms, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2016,
12:44PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-to-rule-on-illegal-tax-breaks-for-multinationals- 1452506740.
15

Id.

16

Id.

17
Arthur Beasley, Apple to Start Paying €13bn to Ireland Over Back Tax Claim, THE FINANCIAL TIMES
(April 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9ee3943e-47d3-11e8-8ae9-4b5ddcca99b3.
18

VAT Fraud in the European Union: A Tax Net Full of Holes, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/6923936.
19
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20
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21
James Willhite, EU Corporate Tax Crackdown Expands, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2015, 6:20AM),
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purchase of goods and services.22 Showing that national governments may disagree on the same
question of law, the United States’ Commodity Futures Trading Commission has held that
Bitcoin should be treated not as a currency for purchasing goods and services but instead a
commodity that is purchased.23 Recently, China’s VAT tax regime has been challenged by the
United States as discriminatory toward American-manufactured small aircraft exports to China.24
The United States government has further argued that the Chinese VAT tax system is not
transparent in violation in World Trade Organization rules.25
II. TAX LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Each domestic tax law enacted by a member-state of the EU must be within the scope of
EU law set forth by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). 26 Domestic
tax regulations can be a chief barrier to further integration of the EU’s common market, which
requires the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor.27 The scope and limitations of
EU law are based in the TFEU and any powers not provided to the EU are reserved to the
member-states through the concept of power through conferral.28 Regardless, any tax regime
constructed by an EU member-state is heavily influenced by EU law.29 The scope of EU tax law
applies to the entire territory of the member-states that constitute the EU, and all nationals of EU
member-states, unless a specific exemption to the contrary in EU law applies.30
The power to tax was a critical part of the EU’s founding treaties.31 The EU Council is
comprised of the heads of government from the 28 member-states and is charged with crafting
Directives that define directions and priorities of the EU.32 A Directive is one of five acts that
can be adopted by the EU government if the TFEU provides it should do so.33 An EU Directive
22

Jacob Gershman, For Bitcoin, EU Tax Ruling Was Right On The Money, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/10/22/for-bitcoin-eu-tax-ruling-was-right-on-the-money/.
23

Id.

24
William Mauldin, U.S. Brings WTO Case Against China Over Smaller Planes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8,
2015, 10:10AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-brings-wto-case-against-china-over-smaller-planes- 1449587899.
25

Chun Han Wong, China Expresses Regret Over U.S. Trade Challenge, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2015,
7:18AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expresses-regret-over-u-s-trade-challenge-1449663481.
26

PANAYI, supra note 11, at 3.

27

Id. at 5.

28

T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 110 (7th ed. 2010).

29

PANAYI, supra note 11, at 3.

30
Dimitry Kochenov, Substantive and Procedural Issues in the Application of European Law in the
Overseas Possessions of European Union Member States, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L. L. 195, at 201 (2008).
31

Agustin Jose Menendez, Taxing Europe: Two Cases For A European Power To Tax (With Some
Comparative Observations), 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 297, at 298 (2004).
32

CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 75.

33

HARTLEY, supra note 27, at 105.
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is different than an EU Regulation in that the latter specifies rules that apply at the EU level and
national level with no discretion for the member-state.34 Directives, in contrast, are not binding
on member-states but require the member-state to enact domestic legislation to achieve a
particular goal.35 Therefore, in the case of a Directive, the member-state is given discretion to
determine which method is most suitable to achieve the goal behind the Directive. 36 Depending
upon the construction of the Directive by the EU Council, the Directive may leave little room for
the member-state to achieve that goal.37 In most cases, a new Directive gives the EU’s memberstates 18 to 24 months to enact implementing legislation.38 A Directive is also deemed to be of
“indirect effect” in that it does not impose obligations on individuals.39
The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC was designed to further harmonize the VAT tax
system within the EU – a process started by the first five Directives.40 There were 53 Articles
within the Sixth Council Directive.41 Since the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC was in fact
a Directive, and not a Regulation, the goal of the EU Council was to get the member-states to
craft implementing legislation that would harmonize the VAT tax system on the various areas
which the Sixth Council Directive touched.42 The Sixth Council Directive created a framework
for a uniform VAT tax base in the form of upper and lower limits whereby the upper limits
would be flexible but the lower limits inflexible.43 Directive 77/388/EEC has been amended
over time to make the EU economy more competitive.44 Council Directive 2006/112/EC recast
the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC but did not affect its substantive content.45
A Seventh Directive was later added to combat economic trade distortion.46 There exists
criticism of the Sixth Council Directive because it has not met its ultimate goal of making sure
that all goods and services are taxed at the final point of consumption.47
34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

HARTLEY, supra note 27, at 106.

38

CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 99.

39

HARTLEY, supra note 27, at 234.

40
Rachel J. Tischler, The Power to Tax Involves the Power to Destroy: How Avant-Garde Art Outstrips the
Imagination of Regulators, and Why A Judicial Rubric Can Save It, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1665, at 1673 (2012).
41

TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 3, at 305.

42

Id. at 172.

43

MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 286-287 (7th ed. 2012).

44

Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Biometrics: Solving The Regressivity of VATs and RSTs With Smart
Card” Technology, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 651, at 684-685 (2006).
45

TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 3, at 305.

46

Tischler, supra note 39, at 1674.

47

Stephen Bill, Practical Application of European Value Added Tax to E-Commerce, 38 GA. L. REV. 71, at

71 (2003).
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All OECD members, save the United States, employ a VAT tax, a tax on consumption of
goods and services and not income.48 Even at the time of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, all
member-states except for France used a version of the VAT tax system.49 The EU memberstates were first ordered in 1967 to have a VAT tax system in place by 1970 pursuant to the First
and Second Directives on the VAT tax.50 The VAT tax has been described as an indirect,
general tax applied by member-states to goods and services.51 The VAT tax is an indirect tax in
that it is paid by a consumer of goods and services instead of the traditional taxpayer.52 A
consumer generally sees the VAT tax as a sales tax in that the tax is assessed at each level of
production of a good or service throughout the stream of commerce.53 The total value added by
a firm is equal to the total income earned on each factor of production.54 The VAT tax is also
considered a general tax in that it is designed to apply to all expenditures associated with the
consumption of goods and services, which includes all stages of the stream of commerce such as
production and distribution.55 The VAT tax is also deemed to be neutral in that it is assessed and
collected at each step in the stream of commerce.56 The deduction mechanism of the EU’s VAT
tax system ensures that within each member-state’s territory, goods and services maintain the
same tax level.57
In regard to international trade throughout the EU, the VAT tax can always apply to an
import regardless of whether the importer is a firm or private person; however, the VAT tax
cannot apply to exports.58 Pursuant to the EU’s VAT tax system, the exporting member-state
accounts for sales of exports, but not at the border, thereby reducing any trade friction at the
border.59 Exports come into the member-state with the exporting country’s taxes, and the
importing country will later invoice the exporting country to recoup VAT taxes.60 The VAT tax
is an important part of the EU government budget as the EU does not have the power to directly
48

The Pros and Cons of VAT:
http://www.economist.com/node/14903016.
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ECONOMIST

(Nov.

19,

49

HORSPOOL & HUMPHREYS, supra note 42, at 286.

50

ANTONIO CALISTO PATO & MARLON TAVARES MARQUES, FUNDAMENTALS OF VAT 15-16 (2015).

51

Bill, supra note 46, at 72.

52

PATO & MARQUES, supra note 49, at 20.

53

2009),

VAT Fraud in the European Union: A Tax Net Full of Holes, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/6923936.
54

LARRY NEAL, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 135 (2007).

55

PATO & MARQUES, supra note 49, at 22.

56

Id. at 24.

57

Id.

58

HORSPOOL & HUMPHREYS, supra note 42, at 286, 287.

59

NEAL, supra note 53, at 136.

60

Id.
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tax Europeans directly.61 When a taxable person pays VAT tax, one part of the total tax goes to
the member-state, and a second part goes to the EU government’s coffers.62
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE VAT TAX.
One commentator states that the VAT tax has circumscribed the globe more quickly than
any other form of taxation in modern history.63 Neal cites two advantages to a VAT tax,
including an incentive for firms to honestly report taxes and an end to the debate on how taxes
should be levied on labor and capital.64 Regardless, the VAT tax system has been criticized as
being so complex that it is not well understood.65 The eventual goal is to move the application of
the VAT tax in the EU from the state of destination to the state of origin of goods and services,
but this reality has not been achieved to date.66 Previous to efforts to harmonize the VAT tax
system, VAT tax differences within the EU distorted trade among the member-states.67
Regardless, despite incredible efforts at harmonization, there exist VAT tax differences across
the member-states.68 Differences in VAT tax application across the member-states still leads to
some trade distortion and high administrative costs associated with accounting for VAT tax.69
Comparatively, sales and VAT taxes make up a greater portion of the overall tax bill in
Europe than in the United States.70 The United States does not implement a VAT-like tax or
sales tax except at the state and local government levels.71 However, there is comment that the
concept of a VAT tax is growing support in the United States despite previous arguments that the
VAT tax hurts the poor and serves as a funds-generator for the implementing government.72
Many who claim that too much income inequality exists in the United States also argue a
consumption-based tax system, if implemented in the United States, would reduce that inequality
in that such a tax system would be progressive and allow the federal government to redistribute

61

CINI & BORRAGAN, supra note 9, at 5.

62

Menendez, supra note 30, at 306.

63

SCHENK, ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.

64

NEAL, supra note 53, at 135.

65

Menendez, supra note 30, at 307.

66

HORSPOOL & HUMPHREYS, supra note 42, at 287.

67

NEAL, supra note 53, at 135.

68

CLEAVER, supra note 4, at 128.

69

Id.

70

PAUL KUBICEK, EUROPEAN POLITICS 273 (2012).

71

SCHENK ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.

72
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income at greater levels.73 Conservatives, in contrast, have argued against the VAT tax,
contending that such a tax system makes it too easy for governments to raise revenue. 74 Still
other supporters argue the use of the VAT tax system in the United States would shore up the
U.S. Treasury, would be less visible and easier to implement than income tax because taxable
persons would not have to file returns, and would expand the tax base and help pay for cashstrapped federal programs.75 Although a VAT tax in the United States would likely end the
deduction for interest on mortgages, an advisory committee in California actually endorsed a
VAT tax for that state.76
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WORK
The purpose of this work is three-fold. First, this work is designed to provide a working
knowledge of the EU’s VAT tax system through the lens of the ECJ’s jurisprudence. Second,
this paper will provide an insight into the difficulties associated with the use of a Directive and
accompanying jurisprudence in an effort to harmonize an area of law across the EU’s memberstates. Third, and most importantly, this work will examine whether the Sixth Council Directive
77/388/EEC is having the intended effect of harmonizing the VAT tax law across the EU.

V. DECISIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
This work will provide an examination of the jurisprudence of the ECJ on the Sixth
Council Directive 77/388/EEC through various cases placed into thirteen categories, including
profits, language and uniformity, federalism, relations between organizations, forms of business
association and location of services, additional taxes implemented by member-states, method of
VAT tax refunds, additional administrative requirements, specific use of goods, member-state
discretion, financial transactions, tax evasion, and shifting VAT tax liability.
A. Profits
In Kennemer Golf v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, the ECJ answered two key questions
regarding the status of organizations that wish to avoid the VAT tax that many EU countries
assess on goods and services.77 First, the ECJ stated that it is the organization, not the individual
services, that is the beneficiary and source of the VAT tax exemption.78 Second, the ECJ held
73
Inequality and Taxes: Equality Doesn’t Always Mean Redistribution, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 2011,
8:39PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/12/inequality-and-taxes.
74

Tax
Policy:
The
VAT
of
the
Land,
THE
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/05/tax-policy.
75

ECONOMIST

(May

3,

2012),

Id.

76
The Pros and Cons of VAT: A Last Resort, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/14903016; Tax Policy: The VAT of the Land, THE ECONOMIST (May 3, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/05/tax-policy.
77

Case C-174/00, Kennemer Golf v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, [2002] ECR I-3293, at ¶ 15.

78

Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.
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that organizations can still fall under the protection of Article 13 of Directive 77/388/EEC even
if the organization attempts to develop budgetary surpluses (i.e., “profits”) each year on the
services that they provide, so long as the proceeds are not distributed to members and the
proceeds are reinvested towards the organization’s mission.79 In reaching this conclusion, the
ECJ was able to simply distinguish between profitable gain for members versus profitable gain
used “to pay for the maintenance of, and the future improvements to, the facilities.”80
What made the case at bar most interesting is that the Dutch tax authority believed that it
could separate the services rendered by the organization from the overall organization because
the latter did indeed possess positive revenues each year largely from membership dues and
admission fees that it charged to its members, and it owned physical facilities that included a golf
course and clubhouse.81
B. Language and Uniformity
In a case similar to Kennemer Golf, the ECJ was asked in Institute of the Motor Industry
v. Commissioners to determine the proper purpose of tax exempt organizations under Article 13
of Directive 77/388/EEC.82 The Institute of the Motor Industry was a voluntary-member trade
union which had as its primary purposes to improve the standards of its members at work,
improve career structures for its members, and enhance the public perception of the industry and
the people working in the industry.83 The Institute also validated courses offered by other
organizations that promoted the necessary skills for the workers within the motor industry and
keeping its members informed about skill changes across the industry.84 Similar to the condition
in Kennemer Golf , the Institute charged a membership fee to its members.85
The British tax authority denied the Institute VAT tax-exempt status because the former
believed that the latter was not an organization included within Article 13, based on the English
language use of the term “trade union.”86 However, although the ECJ acknowledged that
linguistic differences can cause problems in regard to EU law interpretation, the ECJ made it
clear that one language’s version is never the “sole basis for the interpretation of that provision”
and that in order to achieve uniformity in EU law, the general purpose of the provision must be
examined.87 The ECJ also stated that the aim of Directive 77/388/EEC, at least in part, is to
exempt activities in the public interest from the VAT tax.88 Further, the ECJ held that if the main
79

Id. at ¶ 28.

80

Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28.

81

Id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 13.

82

Case C-149/97, Inst. of the Motor Indus. v. Comm’rs, [1998] ECR I-7053.

83

Id. at ¶ 12.

84

Id.

85

Id. at ¶ 5.

86

Id. at ¶¶ 7-8, 9-12.

87

Id. at ¶ 16.

88

Id. at ¶ 18.

85
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purpose of an organization is to represent the collective interests of its members, such a purpose
falls within the confines of Article 13’s public interest requirement.89
C. Federalism
Virtually all federal systems of government, and specifically the levels of those federal
governments, will have disagreements concerning each level’s sphere of influence. In Swedish
State v. Stockholm Lindopark, the ECJ held that the Article 13 of Directive 77/388/EEC prohibits
national governments from creating their own VAT tax exemption laws.90 Here, the ECJ heard
an argument from plaintiff Stockholm Lindopark, an operator of athletic facilities, that Sweden
must follow the EU Directive regarding nonprofit organizations and should have the power to
craft a more limited rule on tax exemption for such organizations.91 In addition to holding that
the Swedish government is bound by a federalist EU Directive, the ECJ also found that a
nonprofit organization could sue the national government for back taxes paid pursuant to the
national law.92
The ECJ upheld similar federalist principles in Commission v. Spain.93 Specifically in
the case at bar, the Spanish government argued that language in Article 13 of Directive
77/388/EEC allowed national governments to limit the application of VAT tax-exempt status.94
Pursuant to a 1992 law, the Spanish government had enacted a law that limited the amount in
membership fees that a nonprofit organization could charge and still benefit from VAT tax
exemption.95 In deciding that the Sixth Council Directive does not allow a member-state to place
limitations on VAT tax exempt status, the ECJ reasoned that some truly nonprofit organizations
would lose the exemption merely because of their memberships and not because of their mission
and, likewise, for-profit organizations may be able to take advantage of the Spanish law by
keeping their membership fees lower.96
D. Relations Between Organizations
In SUFA v. Staatssecretaris van Fiinancien, the ECJ dealt with the sticky issue of VAT
tax application to services provided by one nonprofit organization to another nonprofit
organization.97 Here, the question was whether a nonprofit organization was entitled to a VAT
89

Id. at ¶ 21.

90

Case C-150/99, Swedish State v. Stockholm Lindopark [2001] ECR I-493, at ¶ 23.

91

Id. at ¶¶ 12-12, 19.

92

Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.

93

Case C-124/96, Comm’n v. Spain, [1998] ECR I-2501.

94

Id. at ¶¶ 14-16.

95

Id. at ¶ 3.

96

Id. at ¶ 17.

97
Case C-348/87, Stichting Uitvoering Financiele Acties (“SUFA”) v. Staatssecretaris van Financien,
[1989] ECR I-1737, at ¶ 4.
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tax exemption when it provides services to a second nonprofit organization and that latter
organization acts to render services for its members.98 In response, the ECJ held that a nonprofit
organization that supplies services to another organization is not exempt under Article 13 of
Directive 77/388/EEC.99 The ECJs justification rested on its interpretation of the Directive that a
VAT tax exemption requires a showing that the organization is acting on behalf of its members
and is doing so independently.100
E. Form of Business Association and Location of Services
The ECJ ruled in Gregg v. Commissioners that although a partnership may not have a
legal personality under national law (here, Northern Ireland), the operators of a nursing home are
entitled to a VAT tax exemption under Article 13 of Directive 77/388/EEC.101 In Gregg, the
United Kingdom tax authority was not willing to extend VAT tax exemptions to a partnership
operated by a married couple that offered nursing home services to patients, interpreting pursuant
to UK law that a partnership was not eligible for a VAT tax exemption reserved only for
“institutions.”102 Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC extends a VAT tax
exemption to hospitals, medical treatment centers, similar establishments, organizations, and
other entities that engage in medical care activities governed by public law as well as the supply
of goods and services linked to social security and welfare.103 UK law, pursuant to its Value
Added Tax Law of 1994, extended the same VAT tax exemption to “hospitals” and
“institutions.”104
The ECJ began its opinion by stating that the language within the Sixth Council Directive
must be narrowly interpreted so as not to allow the various VAT tax exceptions to exist because
the general principle behind the EU’s VAT tax scheme requires that all services be subject to the
VAT tax.105 The ECJ believed that the various terms identified in both Directive 77/388/EEC
and the UK Value Added Tax Law of 1994 were broad enough to include the activities of the
plaintiffs’ partnership, that the focus as to whether the EU’s VAT tax system should apply must
be on the activities delivered, and that the EU legislature did not intend to limit the application of
the VAT tax based on the form of business association.106 Furthermore, and relatedly, the ECJ
believed that the principle of fiscal neutrality requires that all providers of similar services should
be treated the same regardless of the form of the business association.107
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The ECJ similarly held that pursuant to Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive
77/388/EEC, a national government cannot condition the VAT tax exemption on the form of
business association for which the organization is created.108 Additionally, the ECJ has held that
the tax exemption for medical services cannot be conditioned upon the location of the services
and instead requires that the services, medical or therapeutic, be rendered to those in need of
public welfare.109 In Ambulater, the German government contended that a limited liability
company was not entitled to the VAT tax exemption because it was organized as such and that it
provided medical services on an outpatient basis, often in a patient’s home.110 Once again, the
ECJ stated that the principle of fiscal neutrality prohibits member-states from implementing
national law that treats economic operators of the same services differently, and the delivery of
medical services is no different.111 However, the ECJ went further and commented that its case
law has been consistent in commanding that VAT tax exemptions must be dedicated to creating a
common system of VAT tax espoused by Directive 77/388/EEC.112 According to the ECJ, in
order to be eligible for the VAT tax exemption pursuant to Directive 77/388/EEC, a particular
business association is not required but rather only that medical services are rendered by a person
or persons with the requisite professional qualifications.113 Furthermore, the ECJ extended the
scope of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC to apply to general care and domestic help
through outpatient services under Article 13’s category of “supply of services,” which are linked
to welfare and social security, and more importantly, gave notice to economic actors that they
can rely on Article 13’s provisions to combat national law not in conformity with this
principle.114
F. Additional Taxes Implemented by Member-States
In GIL Insurance Ltd and Others v. Commissioners, the ECJ made it clear that a VAT tax
can legally be separated from other taxes, duties, and charges issued by a member-state based
one of the characteristics that a VAT tax must contain, including that the VAT applies generally
to transactions relating to goods or services; the levy is proportional to the value of the goods or
services and the volume of transactions for which the levy applies; the levy is charged at each
stage of production; and the levy is applied to the added value of the goods and services.115 The
plaintiffs, including GIL Insurance and other insurance providers, contended that the United
Kingdom’s special taxation system for domestic appliances, motor cars, and travel services
violated Articles 33 and 27 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC because the Sixth Council
108
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Directive requires member-states to get permission from the EU Council to impose a higher rate
of VAT on insurance contracts and the United Kingdom’s Insurance Premium Tax (“IPT”) was
not a VAT tax in that it did not apply generally to all goods and services.116
The United Kingdom’s IPT (implemented in 1994) applied a tax rate of 2.5% on the
receipt of insurance premiums by an entity providing insurance services but was supplemented in
1997 by a new rate of 4.0% and a higher rate of 17.5% on insurance premiums associated with
motor cars, domestic appliances (when the insurance is sold by an entity associated with the
supplier of the appliance), and travel services (travel insurance sold through travel agents)
applied at the same time the VAT tax was applied.117 The British government, in an attempt to
change consumer behavior through its taxation system and raise revenue, contended that the IPT
was enacted in order to assess all insurance contracts at the same, lower rate of 2.5% (then
4.0%), which was lower than the 17.5% VAT tax rate on contracts for the repair and
maintenance of appliances sold or rented (which was also exempted), with the end goal of
getting consumers to purchase traditional insurance from traditional insurers and thus pay the
non-exempted 4.0% on the insurance contract.118 However, the IPT was not successful. Thus,
the British government moved the IPT to the VAT rate and applied it only to certain types of
insurance contracts and associated insurance transactions involving domestic appliances, motor
cars, and travel services, with the belief that suppliers of these products could easily manipulate
prices of the appliances and the associated insurance contracts.119
Three key provisions of the Sixth Council Directive were important in the case at bar.
Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC allows member-states to put forth taxes on
insurance contracts so long as these taxes are not turnover taxes and so long as those imposed
taxes do not interfere with trade between and among member-states.120 Article 27 of the Sixth
Council Directive allows the EU Council to grant permission to a member-state to introduce
special tax measures that otherwise would interfere with the general intent of the Sixth Council
Directive in order to prevent tax evasion or tax avoidance so long as those special tax measures
do not affect the total amount of tax due at the final consumption stage. 121 Lastly, Article 13 of
the Sixth Council Directive provides for a general exemption of VAT taxes pursuant to insurance
and reinsurance transactions and related services conducted by insurance brokers and agents.122
On the question of whether a member-state can introduce a levy on insurance premiums
that looks like a VAT tax but is not considered to be a VAT tax by that member-state’s
government, the ECJ found the United Kingdom’s IPT did not violate Article 33 of Directive
77/388/EEC.123 The plaintiffs contended that the higher rate IPT was a special tax charged on
116
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insurance services and constituted a turnover tax prohibited by Article 33 since the tax met many
of the criteria for a VAT tax but did not apply to all economic transactions.124 Contrary to this
position, the ECJ stated that member-states are able to impose taxes that do not meet one or all of
the main characteristics of a traditional VAT tax, including the levy which is not a VAT tax not
reaching all economic transactions.125 The ECJ also believed that the IPT was allowed by
Article 33 despite the fact that it did not match the VAT tax because it was not assessed at each
point of production and distribution, only assessed at the conclusion of the insurance contract
and did not apply to the added value of the services.126
The ECJ next addressed whether Article 27 of the Sixth Council Directive of Directive
77/388/EEC prohibits a member-state’s implementation of a levy on insurance premiums at a
special rate, yet identical to the VAT tax rate, without seeking prior approval from the EU
Council.127 The plaintiffs asserted that the United Kingdom government was obliged to seek
permission from the EU Council to impose a higher IPT on an insurance contract with the goal
of limiting tax avoidance.128 The United Kingdom countered that interested parties such as the
plaintiffs should have realized that member-states had the authority to impose a higher rate of
taxation on insurance contracts pursuant to Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive in order to
compensate for losses due to Article 13’s provision for exemption of VAT on insurance
premiums.129 The ECJ agreed with the United Kingdom’s position, holding that Article 27 of the
Sixth Council Directive should be interpreted as to allow a member-state to impose a higher rate
of taxation, separate from the VAT tax, without having to make a separate request to the EU
Council to do so; and thus member-states can impose different tax rates on insurance contracts
freely. The ECJ also held that the IPT was not a turnover tax as prohibited by Article 33.130
The ECJ gave member-states freedom to levy taxes on transactions subject to the VAT
tax so long as the taxes cannot be deemed turnover taxes.131 In Kerrutt v. Finanzamt, a German
couple was ordered to pay taxes on a series of contracts that included the purchase of the grounds
for a new apartment building, as well as the for the construction of the building, the supervision
of the construction, documentation expenses, finance procurement, and general management.132
Specifically, the Kerrutts claimed that although the contractual provisions for the supply of
building materials would be subject to the VAT tax, the contractual provisions for the land
acquisition should be exempt under Directive 77/388/EEC, which prohibits double taxation by a
member-state through the imposition of transfer taxes or VAT taxes on the same transaction
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because in their opinion the entire group of activities amounted to one transaction. 133 In contrast
to the position of the Kerrutts, the German government and the EU Commission contended that
the individual activities the couple engaged in amounted to several, individual transactions
instead of just one transaction that would be exempt pursuant to Directive 77/388/EEC since
none of the activities qualified for an exemption.134
The ECJ held that no provision of EU law, including Directive 77/388/EEC, prohibits a
member-state from maintaining a tax regime that allows for a transaction to be taxed through a
VAT tax and any other tax so long as the latter tax is not a turnover tax, even if the transaction is
subject to what would otherwise constitute double taxation.135 Making the ending jurisprudence
easier for the ECJ was its answer to the first question. The ECJ answered affirmatively whether
the contract for the purchase of goods and services supporting a building’s construction was
subject to the VAT tax.136 However, the ECJ did state that the actual purchase of the property on
which the building would be placed was not subject to the VAT tax.137
Although the ECJ recognized the need for tax harmonization across the EU, while
agreeing with the German government and the European Commission, the ECJ could not find
any prohibition or limitation on a member-state’s desire to tax the transaction in the case at bar
anywhere in EU law and thus EU law does allow for a concurrent taxation system.138
G. Method of VAT Tax Refunds
The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC was amended by Directive 95/7/EC with the
intent of simplifying the implementation of measures associated with the VAT tax.139 Articles
17 and 18 of Directive 77/388/EEC, collectively, require member-states to allow taxable persons
to deduct immediately from their VAT liability, as appropriate, when the deduction amount
exceeds the amount of the tax due.140 Also, according to Articles 17 and 18, the member-state
can either issue a refund or allow the taxable person to carry the excess forward to the next
taxing period.141 If the potential amount of the deduction is insignificant, the member-state need
not allow for a refund or a carry forward.142 Italian law, however, provided that the Italian
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government, in lieu of a refund or a carry-forward provision, would issue a bond in the amount
of the deduction to the taxable person.143
The EU Commission issued a complaint against Italy contending that the Italian policy
on refundable VAT taxes was in violation of Directive 77/388/EEC.144 According to the EU
Commission, the Directive provided for a taxable party’s right to deduct the excess VAT tax it
has paid and mandated that member-state governments to make the refunds immediate.145 The
EU Commission further reasoned that the taxable entities may need access to those funds as part
of their working capital and, if ordered to hold government bonds, may need to access a loan
from a bank that may charge a higher rate of interest than what is paid on the government
bond.146
The ECJ found that the Italian government’s policy was in violation of Directive
77/388/EEC, and in doing so, rejected several arguments put forth by Italy as it attempted to
provide justification for forcing taxable persons to accept bonds in lieu of an immediate refund
and/or allowing for the excess VAT taxes to carry forward.147 First, and perhaps most
importantly, the ECJ held that the VAT taxation system was common and that all taxable persons
across all member-states in the EU should be held to the same standards and benefits, resulting in
a neutral taxation system.148 Second, the ECJ stated the full credit owed to a taxable person must
be the result of the member-state’s action, and the refund must be in liquid means or an
equivalent form and must be realized in a reasonable period of time, during which the Italian
bonds ran the risk of not being liquid, would not result in a reasonable time for the VAT tax
deduction, and might not allow for a full recovery of the value of the deduction. 149 Third,
according to the ECJ, it did not matter that there were few firms that would actually hold the
Italian bonds as part of its excess VAT tax deduction plan.150 Fourth, and certainly crucial to the
functioning of the EU, the ECJ did not excuse the Italian government’s policy in light of the fact
that Italy contended that it could not meet all of the obligations accrued by VAT tax refunds
owed to taxable persons if the government were to strictly adhere to Directive 77/388/ECC.151
The ECJ has held, however, that the determination of whether a derogation is
proportionate to a member-state’s stated needs regarding its VAT tax system is best left to a

143

Id. at ¶¶ 5, 6. The bonds issued by the Italian government were of five-year and ten-year maturities. Id.

144

Id.

145

Id. at ¶ 16.

146

Id. at ¶ 19.

147

Id. at ¶ 39.

148

Id. at ¶ 30.

149

Id. at ¶¶ 34, 36.

150

Id. at ¶ 37.

151

Id. at ¶ 38.

at ¶15.

THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

92

national court.152 Regardless, in Molenheide v. Belgium, the ECJ did state that some memberstate legislation in the form of an attempted derogation from Directive 77/388/EEC, such as
using a date different from the date when the retained VAT balance would have been otherwise
paid to calculate the appropriate amount of interest, would not be proportionate to a memberstate’s interest.153 Regardless, the ECJ left it for the national courts to determine whether
Belgium’s VAT tax withholding regulation, employed to prevent tax evasion and dubbed
“preventive attachment,” was acceptable given that Directive 77/388/EEC requires memberstates to either refund eligible VAT tax funds or to carry the refund amount forward to the next
year.154 Pursuant to the Belgian legislation, the Belgian government could engage in a
preventive attachment proceeding which withholds potentially refundable VAT taxes to taxable
persons upon the presentment of an official report containing a presumption or evidence of
ineligibility for a refund and serving the official report to the taxable person.155 The retained
VAT tax funds would remain retained until the presumption or evidence was refuted. 156 The
taxable person could only attack the preventive attachment in court but the court itself could not
order the release of funds until the presumption or evidence was refuted.157
In all four of the cases consolidated by the ECJ, the Belgian government articulated
grounds for maintaining a preventive attachment of VAT tax funds that the plaintiffs (taxable
persons) argued should have been refunded to them.158 Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that
Directive 77/388/EEC only allowed a member-state to either refund the VAT tax funds to be
deducted and carried forward and thus the Directive did not allow a member-state to engage in
“preventive attachment” procedure.159
In Molenheide, the ECJ gave perhaps its best articulation of the provision of the Sixth
Council Directive 77/388/EEC, requiring a uniform VAT tax system and harmonization of VAT
tax throughout the EU. The ECJ stated that the Sixth Council Directive was designed to
harmonize the rules across the member-states on the subject of allowable deductions.160 The
ECJ then stated that although Directive 77/388/EEC does not expressly prohibit the preventive
attachment method, a member-state must still show that this method of ensuring tax compliance
is proportional.161 Proportionality, according to the ECJ, means that although a member-state
152
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may impose regulations designed to protect its finances, the regulations cannot undermine the
EU requirement that there exist a common VAT tax system or fundamental requirement of that
common VAT tax system, which is the right to deduct VAT tax when appropriate.162
Of chief importance while arguing that the preventive attachment method was
disproportionate and thus a violation of Directive 77/388/EEC, the plaintiffs stated that the
Belgian preventive attachment system was absolute whenever a VAT tax dispute occurred and
because compulsory, there was an irrebuttable presumption that goes much further than
necessary to ensure tax compliance.163 The ECJ agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the
Belgian system created an irrebuttable presumption in favor of the government that, in turn, also
denied taxable persons seeking a VAT tax reduction a denial of judicial review and together such
a system would be disproportionate to Belgium’s interests in maintaining a VAT tax system free
from tax evasion.164 Likewise, the ECJ agreed with the plaintiffs that use of a date, other than
that on which the VAT tax refund was due, to calculate interest the Belgian government would
have to pay on funds subject to a preventive attachment is disproportionate as measured against
the goal of maintaining an effective VAT tax system.165
H. Additional Administrative Requirements
Article 11 of Directive 77/388/EEC is designed to foster the harmonization of VAT taxes
throughout the EU by fixing the taxable amount of VAT.166 Article 27, however, allows
member-states to engage in derogations of that fixed amount founded in Article 11 when
attempting to simplify procedures for charging VAT taxes.167 In Commission v. Belgium, the
ECJ found Belgium’s derogations, which allowed for variations of the VAT tax based on the age
of the car at the time of sale, the use of the car, and the difference between the catalog price and
the stated minimum price, to violate the tenets of Directive 77/388/EEC.168
Belgian law stated that, generally, cars sold in or imported into Belgium were to be
assessed a VAT tax not lower than the catalog price, but when the car has been used by a
manufacturer or dealer for the manufacturer’s or dealer’s own use (an “appropriated car”), the
VAT tax charged would be only the catalog price assessed to a new car if the car was sold within
six months.169 If the appropriated car was sold between six months and eighteen months, the
VAT tax assessed would be equal to the amount of the difference between the catalog price and
the sale price.170 Lastly, if the appropriated car was sold later than eighteen months, the VAT tax
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charged would be based on the purchase price or the cost price of a similar, new version of the
appropriated car.171 Belgian law also identified the catalog price of a car to be freely fixed by a
manufacturer for a car sold in Belgium but set by an authorized agent if the car was sold outside
of Belgium.172
In bringing the complaint, the EU Commission contended that the derogations Belgium
had made for appropriated cars was not acceptable within the scope of Article 27 of Directive
77/388/EEC because the derogations were too general in character and potentially harm the
uniformity set in Article 11, which requires a fixed, taxable amount of VAT assessed to goods
and services.173 Also, the EU Commission did not find legitimacy in Belgium’s argument that
the derogations were needed to combat tax evasion or simplify the VAT tax system and that
Belgium could implement less coercive measures.174
In contrast, Belgium argued that Article 27’s derogations provisions do not set limits on
member-states’ ability to set such exceptions and the only real limitation is that a member-state’s
derogations cannot affect the amount of tax charged at the final consumption stage. 175
Additionally, Belgium contended that its set of derogations was not disproportionate to its aims
of curbing tax evasion in the auto sales sector through several acts such as false declarations of
new car prices, part-exchanges associated with used cars, and the unpaid input taxes deducted by
buyers.176
The ECJ did not find merit in Belgium’s derogations. Specifically, the ECJ found the use
of Belgian catalog prices to be a real threat to price standardization and that the derogations from
Article 11 were not needed to prevent tax evasion and thus were disproportionate to the goals of
the member-state.177 The ECJ further stated that Belgium breached Article 11 of Directive
77/388/EEC for the VAT tax assessment of both domestically-produced and imported cars.178
Despite the flexibility afforded member-states pursuant to Directive 77/388/EEC,
member-states cannot put forth additional requirements that make the right to deduct VAT taxes
either practically impossible or excessively difficult.179 In EGI v. Belgium, the ECJ held that
although it is within the member-state’s authority under Directive 77/388/EEC to require taxable
parties to hold an invoice of particulars associated with sold goods, any additional information
required by a member-state must be limited to what is required for that member-state to ensure
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the accuracy in the levied VAT and supervision of the VAT system.180 Directive 77/388/EEC
requires only that, in order to gain the deduction of VAT payable or already paid, the taxable
party must hold an invoice reflecting the price of the good(s) exclusive of tax, the corresponding
tax at each rate, and any exemptions.181 The Directive also allows member-states to determine
which form of information would serve as an invoice or equivalent. 182 According to Belgian
law, those seeking a VAT tax deduction on the purchase of an automobile must not only possess
the information required by Directive 77/388/EEC, but must also hold information on the type of
vehicle, fittings, accessories, make, model, year, cylinder capacity, horsepower, bodywork
model, chassis number, and the year of registration.183
In the first of two joined cases, the Belgian government denied Mrs. Jorion’s request for a
refund of VAT tax on cars based on the Belgian government’s belief that too many irregularities
existed in the proffered paperwork, including that the serial number on the car was omitted,
deleted VAT tax numbers were used, different signatures appeared throughout the documents,
and some fictitious addresses were found.184 In the second case, the Belgian government was
demanding repayment of deducted VAT taxes due to a lack of VAT tax registration numbers of
suppliers, the absence of a date on which the goods were supplied and services completed, and
an inadequate description.185
According to the ECJ, Directive 77/388/EEC only requires that a required invoice contain
enough information allowing a member-state government to determine whether it will permit a
deduction of VAT taxes.186 However, although the ECJ stated that it is for a member-state’s
national court to determine as such, when the additional sources of information required by a
member-state exceed what is necessary to determine whether VAT taxes can be deducted, that
member-state violates the Directive.187
In Ampliscientifica Srl v. Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, the ECJ stated that
the well-established principles of fiscal neutrality, prohibition of the abuse of rights, and the
principle of proportionality as they apply to the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC do not limit
a member-state’s ability to put in place a requirement that parent firms hold 50% of a
subsidiary’s share capital or stock at the beginning of the tax year, by which the parent company
declares a significant tie between it and the subsidiary in order to simplify its VAT tax
assessment under that member-state’s law.188 Article 4 of the Sixth Council Directive states that
a “taxable person” is a person who independently carries on an economic activity and, subject to
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Article 29 of the Sixth Council Directive, allows member-states to treat several taxable persons
as one taxable person for VAT tax purposes if those persons are closely tied together through
financial means, economic means, and/or organizational means.189 Article 27(1) states that the
EU Council can allow a member-state a derogation when the member-state is attempting to
simplify the procedure for charging tax and/or prevent tax evasion so long as the taxable amount
due is realized at the final consumption stage.190
Pursuant to the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, the Italian government enacted a
law allowing parent firms to add their subsidiaries to create one taxable entity, and the parent
firm could declare that subsidiary so long as both the parent and subsidiary were located within
the same jurisdiction and the parent owns at least 50% of the shares of the subsidiary at the
beginning of the calendar year.191 Also, according to the Italian law, the parent would have to be
able to act on behalf of the subsidiary, and the parent must claim the VAT tax number of the
subsidiary or subsidiaries as its own.192 In Ampliscientifica, both the Ampliscientifica and
Amplifin firms were subsidiaries of the parent Amplifon firm whereby more than 50% of the
shares of Ampliscientifica were owned by Amplifon, and 99% of the shares of Amplifin were
owned by Amplifon.193 When Amplifin was deemed ineligible to make the declaration that
Ampliscientifica was a subsidiary for VAT tax purposes, the firm objected and petitioned the
Italian courts, which in turn sent the case to the ECJ for clarification.194
The ECJ made three very important statements about the ability of a member-state to
create a derogation that would comply with the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC. First,
concerning the principle of fiscal neutrality, member-states must make sure they do not treat
similar goods that are in competition with each other differently within their VAT tax regime.195
More narrowly, the ECJ stated that the Italian government’s requirements for blending a parent
and a subsidiary together for VAT tax purposes does not violate the principle of fiscal neutrality
in that the Italian law is merely making compliance with the VAT tax system easier regarding
payment procedures.196 Second, the ECJ clarified that the abuse-of-rights principle was designed
to make sure that EU law, especially in regard to the EU-wide VAT tax regime, was not used to
cover abusive practices by taxable persons but could be used to prohibit artificial arrangements
and thus the Italian law requiring a full-tax year relationship between the parent and the
subsidiary which do not reflect economic reality and are designed only to gain a tax
advantage.197 Directly, the ECJ stated that the Italian law was a valid means to combat tax
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evasion, avoidance, or abuse, which is encouraged by the Sixth Council Directive.198 Third, on
the subject of the principle of proportionality, the ECJ accepted the yearlong tax period as a
condition that was not disproportionate to the objective set forth in the Italian law to attack tax
evasion and “bogus legal arrangements.”199 In fact, the ECJ commented that an arrangement that
was not at least a year in existence could lead to ad hoc legal relationships designed to merely
defraud.200
I. Specific Use of Goods
According to the ECJ in Talacre Beach v. United Kingdom, a member-state may tax a
good and contents within that good at separate VAT tax rates.201 Talacre Beach was a UK-based
recreational vehicle sales firm specializing in the sale of caravans and the contents inside the
caravan, which included dining tables, chairs, stools, beds, and floor coverings.202 Pursuant to
UK tax law, the caravans were subject to a zero rate of VAT tax; however, the UK government
believed that any sale of a caravan with the various contents identified above would be subject to
a VAT tax on the contents even if the caravan itself was subject to a zero VAT tax rate.203 In
contrast, Talacre Beach believed that the caravans and the contents therein constitute a single,
indivisible sale, and since the caravans were subject to a zero VAT tax rate, the contents sold
within the caravan should also be subject to a zero VAT tax rate.204
The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC allows a member-state to assess zero rates for
some sales transactions, and those transactions are to be considered exemptions for purposes of
the VAT tax.205 However, any such reduced rates adopted by a member-state must have been in
place on January 1, 1991.206
The ECJ stated in its decision that there was nothing in EU law that prevented a memberstate from allowing one element of a good to be taxed at one rate (the caravan) and other
elements to be taxed at other rates (the items within the caravan) in a way that would jeopardize
the integrity of the EU-wide VAT tax system.207 The ECJ did acknowledge that much of the
case law on the topic suggested that the single sale of an item or group of items as a whole
should be taxed at one VAT tax rate, and that same case law did not completely prohibit the
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items within the group in a single sale to be taxed at different rates within the Sixth Council
Directive 77/388/EEC.208
The ECJ provided one of its best evaluations of the ability to deduct from the VAT tax in
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Midland.209 In Midland, the ECJ explained that the
Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC maintains a deduction system that is designed to relieve a
trader in goods and services of the burden of the VAT tax payable or previously paid in the
course of the trader’s economic activities provided that those same activities are subject to the
VAT tax.210 The ECJ additionally commented that Directive 77/388/EEC, specifically Article 17
of the Sixth Council Directive, requires a direct and immediate link between the goods and
services acquired by a trader and the transaction or transactions that follow, which are also
subject to the VAT tax before a deduction can be earned.211 However, the ECJ also stated that
the right to deduct from the VAT tax exists if the trader has been unable to use the goods or
services that serve as inputs into a later transaction that is subject to the VAT tax and the
inability to do so is beyond the control of the trader.212 Furthermore, the ECJ contended that an
exception can be made in special circumstances to the general rule when a direct and immediate
link between the goods and services the trader purchased and the later transaction giving rise to
the ability to deduct cannot be established.213
The ECJ also answered a second question in Midland on the issue of whether a trader can
deduct VAT tax in a later transaction for expenses related to the securing of goods and services
that support the later transaction but where the later transaction was supported by those goods
and services merely by consequence.214 According to the ECJ, the only way by which the trader
could deduct from the VAT tax in that situation is if the trader can show by means of objective
evidence that the expenses associated with acquiring the goods and services supported some of
the components of the later transaction subject to the VAT tax.215 Similarly, the ECJ also stated
that it should be the determination of the reviewing national court to find that cases whereby the
purchased goods and services support some of the components of a later transaction subject to
the VAT tax in a mere consequential manner.216
The facts of Midland are worth description. Here, the United Kingdom tax authorities
challenged the ability of the Midland firm to deduct legal expenses from stemming from a
lawsuit that was related to an attempt to purchase a component of another firm. 217 Although
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Midland attempted to deduct the goods and services purchased (the legal services) to engage in
the purchase of another firm, which is a transaction subject to the VAT tax and a deduction for
goods and services purchased to support that transaction, the British government believed that
the legal services were related to Midland’s business generally, specifically the lawsuit, and not
to the attempt to purchase another firm.218 However, the British government did suggest that
some, but not all of the legal services could be deducted from the VAT tax.219
Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive states that the right to deduct goods and services
from the VAT tax occurs only when a later transaction gives rise to a VAT tax charge and allows
for the deduction of VAT tax when the goods and services support a later transaction, when
those same goods and services are consumed both in cases, and when the later transaction is
exempt from the VAT tax and when not exempt from the VAT tax.220 However, Article 17 also
allows for a proportional deduction from the VAT tax in cases where two or more later
transactions giving rise to the VAT tax are supported by goods and services purchased by the
trader, and only the goods and services purchased by the trader may be deducted that support the
transaction or transactions that allow for a deduction.221
Although the ECJ would allow for deductions pursuant to Article 17 of the Sixth Council
Directive 77/388/EEC, the ECJ made it clear that the factual determinations should be left to
national courts in cases where a direct and immediate link cannot be established between the
trader’s purchased goods and services and the trader’s later transaction due to circumstances
beyond the trader’s control, or where the goods and services support part of the later transactions
that give rise to a VAT tax deduction.222
Article 2 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC states that the VAT tax is applicable
to the sale of goods or services sold within a member-state by a taxable person while Article 5(1)
of the Sixth Council Directive defines the sale of goods as the transfer of the right to dispose of
tangible property as the owner.223 Article 5(8) of the Sixth Council Directive further provides
that when the property is transferred to a new owner, in order to determine whether the sale
includes a partial or a total transfer of assets, member-states may consider that no supply of
goods has taken place and, when doing so, the recipient owner will be treated as a successor to
the transferor. When appropriate, the member-state can also enact measures to prevent distortion
of competition when that same successor is not wholly liable to pay taxes.224 Article 17(2) of the
Sixth Council Directive provides that when goods are purchased for taxable transactions, the
taxable person who is also the purchaser of those same goods is entitled to a VAT tax
deduction.225 In Zita Modes Sarl v. Administration de l’enregistrement et des domaines, the ECJ
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held that member-states can determine that a sale of a business’s totality of assets to a successor
taxable person includes no supply of goods for the purposes of the VAT tax, but when doing so,
that member-state must only use such a determination in order to prevent distortion in
competition.226
In Zita Modes, the plaintiff firm, Zita Modes, sold to another firm, Milady, a ready-towear clothing business and the accompanying invoice claimed that the transaction was not
subject to the VAT tax in Luxembourg.227 Pursuant to Luxembourg tax law, like Article 5(1) of
the Sixth Council Directive, the supply of goods applies to the transfer of ownership rights
whereby the successor may dispose of the tangible property as the owner, but also provided that
the transfer of a totality of assets or partial assets is not to be deemed a supply of goods. 228
Following the sale of the ready-to-wear clothing business to Milady, a perfumery, the
Luxembourg tax authorities notified Zita Modes that since Milady did not continue the business
sold to it (ready-to-wear clothing), the Luxembourg tax law did not apply and thus no VAT tax
deduction would be allowed pursuant to Article 17(2) of the Sixth Council Directive of Directive
77/388/EEC.229 Zita Modes countered that the Luxembourg tax law did not specifically state
that the successor business had to maintain business operations, and since both the buyer and
seller were taxable persons, there should be a full refund of the VAT tax.230
The ECJ made several important statements about the nature of such a transaction for
VAT tax purposes, concluding that Article 5(8) of the Sixth Council Directive of Directive
77/388/EEC allows a member-state to determine that no supply of goods has taken place in a sale
of a business between taxable persons, even if the totality of assets has been transferred. 231 The
ECJ also concluded that a member-state can require the buyer to continue the same business
operations as the seller in order to be exempt from the VAT tax.232 First, when a member-state
uses its discretion to determine that the no-supply-of-goods rule applies to a transaction between
a seller and a buyer, the VAT tax is simply not applicable. 233 Second, this discretion can only be
used to favor a transferee of the sale in order to avoid the distortion of competition.234 The ECJ
commented that these two requirements are founded in the purpose of the Sixth Council
Directive, which is to make sure that the VAT tax system applies uniformly across the memberstates and prevents divergences in interpretation from member-state to member-state.235
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Third, the ECJ remarked that member-states must exercise their discretion pursuant to
Article 5(8) in a way that simplifies the transfer of assets from a buyer to a seller in a way that
also prevents the overburdening of the transferee’s assets, which, without the use of protective
discretion, would otherwise bear the costs of the VAT tax.236 Fourth, the ECJ determined that
member-states’ use of discretion when deciding whether no supply of goods has taken place in a
sale of assets must apply to all transactions and not just certain transfers of assets.237 Fifth, the
same discretion must also apply in cases where the buyer purchases the assets but does not have
the member-state’s permission to engage in the same business as the seller.238
J. Member-State Discretion
In Jetair NV v. FOD Financien, five questions were posed to the ECJ regarding
limitations on a member-state’s ability to charge VAT taxes on travel agent activities involving
excursions outside the EU.239 The plaintiffs, Jetair and Travel4you, worked together to organize
clients’ international travel, offering mainly air travel and hotel reservations, and when billed by
the Belgian government for VAT taxes, claimed back a substantial amount in VAT taxes paid
ahead.240 However, the Belgian government did not refund the entire amount of claimed back
VAT taxes, forcing the commercial partners to litigate on the question of whether Belgian law,
as amended in 1999, would allow the Belgian government to keep the withheld VAT taxes.241
Directive 77/388/EEC addresses the mission of tax harmonization and the plight of travel
agents. Article 1 of the Sixth Council Directive requires member-states to adopt the necessary
domestic law to ensure equal treatment by January 1, 1978.242 Article 26 of the Sixth Council
Directive states that EU member-states must apply the VAT tax to the activities of travel agents
except when they are acting as intermediaries and not directly with their own clients.243
Specifically, and narrowly, if a travel agent is working as an intermediary, the travel agent must
be treated as such for taxation purposes.244 Problematically for the parties in the case at bar, the
Sixth Council Directive also allowed member-states to continue to subject intermediaries to the
VAT tax during a transitional period that began on January 1, 1978 and lasted another five
years.245
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Directive 2006/112/EC (“the VAT Directive”) also required that member-states exempt
the transactions conducted by intermediaries if such transactions are conducted outside the EU
but allowed for the VAT tax to apply to travel agents engaged in activities inside the EU.246
However, the VAT Directive did allow a member-state to continue to tax the activities of travel
agents when acting as intermediaries, even when the activities are conducted outside the EU, as
long as that same member-state taxed such activities before or on January 1, 1978.247 Prior to
December 1, 1977, Belgian law exempted the activities of travel agents acting as intermediaries
when acting outside the EU, but the law was amended on that date so that the VAT tax would
apply to such activities.248 Belgian law was again amended in 1999 and provided that travel
agents could not be treated as intermediaries so that the VAT tax would apply to travel agents
regardless of their activities and whether they were being conducted outside the EU.249
The ECJ first stated that neither Directive 77/388/EEC nor the VAT Directive prohibited
Belgium from changing its law just before the January 1, 1978 date on which the tax
harmonization legislation had to be adopted by member-states and thus travel agent activities
that were focused on travel outside the EU could be subject to the VAT tax.250 The ECJ stated
that, despite the midnight-hour nature of the change, the change would not seriously compromise
the mission of tax harmonization.251 This rationale was adopted by the ECJ despite the fact that
it cited its own precedent that member-states cannot engage in legal maneuvers that would risk
the thrust of any EU law.252
The ECJ also held that the VAT Directive did not mandate that travel agents be treated as
intermediaries when engaged in activities outside the EU for the purposes of taxation.253
According to the ECJ, the VAT Directive actually gave member-states the option of taxing
activities if the same member-state taxed the activity before January 1, 1978.254 Furthermore, the
ECJ claimed that neither Belgian law nor the VAT Directive violated the broader tenets of EU
law generally by allowing member-states to tax the activities of travel agents occurring outside
the EU.255 Surprisingly, the ECJ contended that EU law tolerates differences among the
member-states so long as the EU legislatures have not created a definitive system of their own on
the subject matter, and the member-states maintain their existing legislation as Belgium had
since December 1, 1977 and thus before January 1, 1978.256 The ECJ boldly stated that so long
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as the Belgian government taxed the activity before January 1, 1978, Belgium has the right to
choose whether to continue to tax that activity.257
Lastly, and certainly in a more constitutional fashion, the ECJ stated that Belgium does
not violate the principles of equality, proportionality, and fiscal neutrality by treating travel
agents and intermediaries differently for taxation purposes whereby the activities of travel
agents, but not intermediaries, are subject to the VAT tax.258 According to the ECJ, the EU
legislature contemplated this difference when drafting both Directive 77/388/EEC and the VAT
Directive and found that travel agents and intermediaries do not act comparably. 259 The ECJ
contended that its own jurisprudence only requires similar treatment when such actors are acting
in a similar fashion unless objective justification is found and precedent has been established that
travel agents and intermediaries do not operate similarly.260
Anyone who engages in freelance activity of a professional nature should become
familiar with the ECJ’s decision in Werner Haderer v. Finanzamt Wilmersdorf, in which the ECJ
limited the ability of a national government to narrowly tailor for its own purposes the scope of
Directive 77/388/EEC, holding that freelance university-level instructors must be exempted from
the VAT tax pursuant to the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC.261 In Haderer,
the German government contended that Mr. Haderer, a part-time instructor, must pay the VAT
tax for his teaching activities at adult education institutes where he was paid by a subunit of the
German federal government, the Land of Berlin, over a series of years. 262 Mr. Haderer was paid
an hourly rate, with contributions to his pension, health insurance, and a proportional leave
allowance, only if his courses had sufficient enrollment; however, his total compensation did not
include provisions for social security contributions, insurance, and taxes, all of which was
spelled out in each six-month contract.263
The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC specifically exempts from the VAT tax
educational activities in support of children’s education, school or university education,
vocational training and retraining, individual instruction given by teachers in a school or
university setting, including the supply of services that are closely related to these activities.264
German domestic law provided in regard to the VAT tax that freelance workers such as Mr.
Haderer would not be exempt from paying the VAT tax if their activities amounted to individual
instruction but did exempt the institutions that provide that instruction so long as the instructional
activity is in the public interest or pursuant to the needs of a professional organization.265
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The ECJ first found that although Directive 77/388/EEC did have specific activities that
are subject to the VAT tax exemption, there did exist some activities that would be included
within the public interest category that are explicitly absent from the Directive.266 Furthermore,
the ECJ contended that the provisions in Directive 77/388/EEC did allow for exemptions that
would otherwise meet the intended effect of the Sixth Council Directive regarding either the
activity or the economic agent performing those activities.267 The German government’s chief
contention with the teaching duties of Mr. Haderer was that the instruction of pottery and
ceramics courses were not at the same level of a traditional university course and thus should not
be considered within the definitions of education, vocational training, or training, and instead
were courses more so designed for leisure.268
Contrary to the German government’s position, the ECJ stated that creating divisions
based on what constituted education, vocational training, or training under domestic law could
not be tolerated since such divisions would risk the VAT tax system’s mission of uniformity
across the EU member-states.269 Also, the ECJ commented that it was not necessary to create a
common definition of what constitutes school or university education, but rather, it is incumbent
upon member-states to make sure that the concept of school or university education is not limited
to the traditional courses that end with examinations, qualifications, and/or professional or trade
activity.270 According to the ECJ, the activities of Mr. Haderer were within the exemptions
found in Directive 77/388/EEC merely because, although the lessons were mostly private, there
was a link between his qualifications as a teacher and the content of the instruction.271 Further,
the instruction provided by Mr. Haderer would be exempt from the VAT tax even if there was
not a direct link between the students and the instructor.272 The ECJ also hinted that the
employment relationship between Mr. Haderer and the Land of Berlin was that of a contractual
relationship even as the employment contract signed by Mr. Haderer stated there was no
contractual relationship.273
The ECJ made several pronouncements concerning the interpretation of the Sixth Council
Directive 77/388/EEC in Navicon SA v. Administracion del Estado to assist member-states in
their quest to write accompanying legislation.274 In Navicon, the ECJ was asked to settle a
debate between an international shipping firm, Navicon SA, and the Spanish government on
whether an exemption on the VAT tax pursuant to Article 15(5) of the Sixth Council Directive of
Directive 77/388/EEC could be limited to situations where an international shipper is chartering
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a vessel’s entire cargo space and leaving a member-state with a final destination outside the
EU.275
Pursuant to Article 15(5), VAT tax is to be exempted by member-states when goods are
being exported to a location outside the EU by or on behalf of the vendor.276 However,
according to Spanish legislation, such an exporting act whereby goods are being shipped to a
location outside the EU, the act must include a full charting of the vessel in order to get the VAT
tax exemption.277 The Spanish government denied Navicon SA’s request for a full VAT tax
exemption because the goods in question did not occupy the entirety of the vessel and thus did
not constitute a full chartering of the vessel.278 The Spanish courts, after receiving Navicon SA’s
challenge, referred the question of whether a member-state could limit the VAT tax exemption to
a full chartering of a vessel or, instead, whether a partial chartering of a vessel taking exported
goods to a location outside of the EU could qualify for the VAT tax exemption under Article
15(5) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC.279
First, while citing Articles 3(3) of the Sixth Council Directive and 22.1 of the more
general VAT Law, the ECJ stated that goods being shipped from an EU member-state to another
location outside of the EU, such as in this case from the Iberian Peninsula to the Canary Islands,
would qualify as an export pursuant to the concept of a VAT tax.280 Second, according to the
ECJ, these two provisions of EU law must be interpreted strictly to ensure that at least
preliminarily all goods and services are subject to the VAT tax and, pursuant to the concept of
fiscal neutrality, economic operators are treated the same when engaging in the same transaction
in regard to the VAT tax.281 However, despite these two concerns, a strict interpretation of EU
law cannot strip VAT tax exemptions from their intended effect. 282 Third, since Article 15(5) of
the Sixth Council Directive did not define the term “chartering,” as with any provision of EU
law, the ECJ held itself accountable to examine the wording of the law, the context of the law,
and the objective pursued by the law.283
These pronouncements made the remaining parts of the ECJ’s decision easier. The ECJ
held that the VAT tax exemption under Article 15(5) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC
should apply to exports delivered to a location outside the EU either by a full chartering of a
vessel or a partial chartering of a vessel.284 The ECJ believed that Article 15(5) did not
distinguish between “full chartering” and “partial chartering” concerning eligibility for the VAT
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tax exemption nor did Article 22.1 of the more general VAT Law from which Article 15(5) of
the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC is based.285 Although the ECJ contended
that member-states are responsible for enacting domestic law to implement the Sixth Council
Directive, any domestic law may not interfere with the subject matter of the exemptions
presumed to apply by the EU government.286 The ECJ also addressed the larger scope of
international business and stated that VAT tax exemptions are designed to make sure that goods
are taxed at their destination and that the Spanish government’s requirement of full chartering
would create a condition whereby goods shipped via a full chartering of a vessel would be taxed
at the destination since the VAT tax exemption would apply at the point of shipment, yet goods
delivered through a partial chartering would be taxed at the point of shipment since no VAT tax
exemption would apply.287 Relatedly, the ECJ stated that the Spanish regulation, if upheld,
would tie the taxation of exported goods to the size of a vessel so that large vessels carrying the
goods of several exporters would face a point of departure VAT tax and exports carried on a
small vessel, likely to be those of just one exporter, would be exempt from the VAT tax.288
K. Financial Transactions
Articles 5 and 6 of the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC address possible
exemptions from the VAT tax for the sale of non-tangible interests in property. Specifically,
Article 5 allows member-states to label as tangible property shares or interests, providing the
owner rights of ownership or possession over immovable property as a form of supply of goods,
but also allows member-states to label the selling of those shares or interests as not amounting to
a supply of goods.289 Article 6 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC mandates that a
supply of services transaction must not be labeled a supply of goods transaction and a supply of
goods transaction includes the sale of intangible property regardless of whether that intangible
property establishes title rights.290 Article 13 of the same Directive excludes from the VAT tax
the sale of shares or interests in firms and other securities provided that the sale does not include
management and safekeeping of the firm or security.291
In Staatssecretaris van Financien v. X BV, the ECJ was asked to determine whether the
sale of 30% of a firm’s shares to which the shares’ seller supplied services was exempt from the
VAT tax despite the seller’s services not being exempt from the VAT tax.292 In the case at bar,
the plaintiff, dubbed “X” by the ECJ, sold 30% of the shares dubbed “A” to another firm. 293
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However, at the time of the sale, X had been providing managerial services to A for an agreedupon remuneration, but the services ceased when X disposed of the shares and X left the
managerial board at A as well.294 The Dutch government disagreed with X’s belief that the VAT
taxes billed by the Dutch government pursuant to the sale of the shares in A should be
refunded.295
Before getting to the more complicated question about whether X’s transaction was
subject to the VAT tax regime, the ECJ first had to decide whether Articles 5 and 6 of the Sixth
Council Directive must be read together as mandating that sale of a firm’s shares be considered a
transfer of a totality of assets or services or rather a part thereof whereby the seller was also
providing managerial services subject to the VAT tax.296 According to the ECJ, the purpose of
the Sixth Council Directive was to make transfers of assets easier by guarding against the
possibility that a transferor would be consumed by VAT taxes.297 The ECJ agreed with the
German government’s contention that the totality of a transfer of assets can only occur if the firm
is independent and engages in independent economic activity separate from the economic
activity of the seller of the firm’s shares.298 The ECJ also stated that the mere selling of shares at
the same time the assets of the firm are not sold does not constitute independent economic
activity.299 Also, the transaction is not subject to the VAT tax when a member-state exercises its
option to judge the transaction as one not involving the supply of goods when an owner transfers
the totality of assets.300 The ECJ also found that the Dutch government had exercised this
option.301
The ECJ found that the transfer of the shares in question here could not be considered the
equivalent of the transfer of a totality of assets or a part thereof for the purposes of Article 5 of
the Sixth Council Directive.302 Specific to X’s case, the ECJ stated that there were two separate
transactions including the sale of the shares by X and the ceasing of managerial services by X.303
Therefore, X’s right to deduct depends on whether the costs of the services provided by X as a
consultant relating to the sale of the shares are costs related to the firm’s overall economic
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activity yet separate from the selling price for those shares.304 However, the ECJ left it up to the
Dutch national courts to determine whether this reality existed in X’s case.305
In Regie dauphinoise – Cabinet A. Forest SARL v. Ministre du Budget, the ECJ went to
great lengths to tie many provisions of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC together to
determine whether property managers can deduct interest payments they receive on their clients’
funds entrusted to them from the VAT tax.306 According to the ECJ, Article 2 of the Sixth
Council Directive defines the scope of the EU’s VAT tax system, providing that only activities
that are economic in nature are subject to the VAT tax, and makes clear that a taxable person
must be acting within the scope of an economic activity in order for the VAT tax to apply. 307
Article 4(1) states that a taxable person includes a person who independently engages in an
economic activity while Article 4(2) includes activities of producers, traders, service suppliers,
exploiters of tangible and intangible property for the purposes of obtaining income on a
continuing basis within the definition of economic activities.308
Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC generally governs the right to
deduct from the VAT tax assessment, allows only a deduction when the taxable person when the
goods and services in question are used for the purposes of the taxable transactions, and provides
that only such a proportion of the VAT tax can be deducted that is attributable to VAT taxeligible activities when a taxable transaction includes both VAT tax-eligible components and
non-VAT tax eligible components.309 Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive requires
member-states to exempt from the VAT tax not only transactions that involve the granting,
negotiation, and management of credit, but also transactions that include the negotiation of
deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, checks, and other negotiable
instruments.310 Article 19 of the Sixth Council Directive provides that turnover amounts
attributable to the supply of goods and services used by the taxable person for the purposes of the
business cannot be excluded from the VAT tax.311
In the case at bar, Regie, a property management firm, was told by the French tax
authority that it could only take a pro-rated deduction on its VAT tax assessment since the
transactions it had engaged in on behalf of its clients were exempt from French tax law. 312 More
specifically, Regie, as part of its general management of leased and owned property of its clients,
would take payments from co-owners and lessees of these properties and invest the funds on
Regie’s own account so that Regie would gain the interest on those principal funds, which
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averaged 14%, and then repay the principal funds to the clients. 313 The French tax authority
determined that the turnover amounts corresponding to the investment transactions Regie had
made on behalf of its clients could not be deducted from the VAT tax assessment as “incidental
financial transactions,” which Regie contested.314
The ECJ held that a member-state can prohibit a deduction for interest received on sums
received from clients from a VAT tax assessment as an incidental financial transaction. The ECJ
found a critical difference between merely holding sums on behalf of clients and actively
investing those sums on behalf of clients.315 More narrowly, the ECJ admitted that services
including the mere holding of funds submitted to a bank or property manager would not be
subject to a VAT tax assessment, but this case was different because Regie not only collected the
funds from lessees and co-owners, but also received the funds as a part of their general business
and then invested the funds as a taxable person engaged in a taxable activity. 316 According to the
ECJ, the purpose behind allowing a deduction from a VAT tax assessment for incidental
financial transactions within the scope of Article 19 of the Sixth Council Directive is to meet the
objective of complete neutrality within the EU’s VAT tax system, especially in a case where the
receipts from those transactions would wind up being VAT tax-assessed and the associated
activities did not entail the goods or services subject to the VAT tax.317 The ECJ saw Regie’s
activities differently because it had the consent of its clients to place the funds into Regie’s own
accounts for investment, and such an activity constituted a “direct, permanent and necessary
extension” of a taxable activity performed by a taxable person--here, a property management
firm--and thus such an activity could in no way be characterized as an incidental financial
management transaction.318
L. Tax Evasion
In Finanzampt Bergisch Gladbach v. Skripalle, the ECJ wrestled with the question of
whether two provisions of Directive 77/388/EEC are compatible.319 Article 11 of the Directive
77/388/EEC provides that concerning supplies of goods and services, the entire costs incurred by
the supplier constitutes the consideration that the purchaser must acknowledge upon sale.320
Article 27 of the same directive allows the EU Council to allow member-states to enact
derogations from Directive 77/388/EEC in order to simplify the method or process of taxation or
to prevent tax evasion.321 Specifically, the question posed to the ECJ was whether Article 27 of
313
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Directive 77/388/EEC allowed for derogations by member-states to prevent tax evasion in the
case of supplies for consideration between associations pursuant to Article 11 of the same
Directive.322 If the two Articles of Directive 77/388/EEC are compatible, it is possible for the
minimum basis for assessing the VAT tax to be greater than the market rate yet no tax evasion
would occur in a transaction.323
In the case at bar, Germany’s VAT tax law stated that such tax was determined by a
function of consideration, which included everything the purchaser of the supplies spends to
acquire the supplies after the turnover tax has been deducted.324 The German government,
however, adopted a derogation from German law by adopting a policy that in the case of supplies
for one’s own consumption, the cost of the supplies would be the controlling factor in
determining the turnover tax, which the German government considered a “notional minimum
basis of assessment.”325 Skripalle challenged the German government’s assessment of the VAT
tax on his rental property. The German government believed the minimum basis of assessment to
be higher than the rent Skripalle and his family members who operated the tenant firm had
agreed to even though the the rent was at market value.326
Specifically, both Skirpalle and the EU Commission contended that Article 27 of
Directive 77/388/EEC must be strictly interpreted only to account for tax evasion concerns, and
cannot allow member-states to create changes associated with how the VAT is calculated as
dictated in Article 11.327 Since according to the EU Commission and Skripalle the rent in
question was at market rates, tax evasion could not be an issue and thus the German policy of
establishing a notional minimum basis was not necessary or permissible.328 Separately, Mr.
Skripalle stated that the German law in question created a presumption that a rent agreement
between family members is designed to avoid taxes.329 The German government, in contrast,
stated that its notional minimum basis policy was necessary since very few situations were
reflected by the facts in the case at bar, whereby the agreed-upon rent reflected the market rate
and yet was below the notional minimum basis, which is appropriate to combat tax evasion.330
The ECJ opened the heart of its opinion by stating that there was no disagreement that the
German government had engaged in a derogation by enacting its policy on maintaining a
notional minimum basis for assessing the VAT tax. However, the ECJ further opined that any
such derogations must be strictly construed and that although there is a risk that agreements
between family members may pose a risk of tax evasion, there is no risk of tax evasion when,
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objectively, the facts show that the involved parties have acted properly and especially in this
case where the parties had agreed to a rent value that was in line with the marketplace.331
According to the ECJ, the German policy on the VAT tax was not limited to concerns over tax
evasion, strictly, as required by Article 27.332 The ECJ found this to be important since the
German government had asked for the derogation to combat only tax evasion and not for the
purpose of simplifying the taxation procedure.333 In the end, the ECJ found the German
government’s use of a notional minimum basis for assessing the VAT tax on rent to be an
unallowable derogation in the face of Directive 77/388/EEC.334
M. Shifting VAT Tax Liability
According to the ECJ in Staatssecretaris van Financien v. Pactor Vastgoed BV, pursuant
to the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC, when an adjustment occurs following an
assessment of the VAT tax, only the person who applied the VAT deduction can be assessed a
recovery by a member-state.335 In the case at bar, a supplier that had acquired some immovable
property years earlier and chose at that time to opt for taxation on the property and had the VAT
deducted sold the property to the plaintiff, Pactor Vastgoed, and both Pactor Vastgoed and the
supplier once again opted for taxation on the property.336 Initially, Pactor Vastgoed leased the
property, a transaction that was exempt from the VAT tax, but sometime later sold the property,
also a transaction exempt from the VAT tax.337 The Dutch government believed that the
transaction involving the initial sale of the property to Pactor Vastgoed under Dutch law should
have been exempted from the VAT tax and thus issued an additional assessment of VAT tax
against Pactor Vastgoed.338 In other words, the Dutch government contended that the supplier
and Pactor Vastgoed should not have been able to elect taxation at the original sale. 339 Pactor
Vastgoed levied an objection to the additional assessment of VAT tax with the Dutch tax
authorities, lost the objection, and then appealed to the Dutch courts, which in turn sent the issue
to the ECJ for clarification under EU law.340
Article 4 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC allows member-states to elect to
subject to the VAT tax to transactions involving the sale of a building before it is first occupied,
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or the sale of parts of the building, and/or the land on which the building sits.341 Article 13 of the
Sixth Council Directive mandates that member-states exempt from the VAT tax the sale of
buildings and/or the land on which the building will sit if the transaction is not covered by
Article 4, but also permits member-states to provide the option to taxpayers to elect to pay taxes
on those transactions.342 Article 17 allows a taxed person to deduct VAT taxes from a memberstate’s tax regime when goods or services are supplied to that same taxable person by another
taxable person.343 Article 20 of the Sixth Council Directive allows member-states to make
adjustments in VAT tax calculations when the VAT tax deduction was higher or lower than what
was initially calculated in several scenarios, but whenever doing so, the member-state must make
sure that the adjustment does not provide an unjustified advantage to one of the parties.344
Article 27 of the Sixth Council Directive allows the EU Council to adopt derogations to the
general principles of the Sixth Council Directive to simplify a member-state’s tax regime so long
as there is no effect on the final taxed amount at the last stage of consumption.345 Council
Decision 88/498/EEC was adopted pursuant to Article 27 of the Sixth Council Directive of
Directive 77/388/EEC, which allows the Netherlands government to impose VAT tax liability on
the purchaser of buildings and/or parts thereof and/or land on which the building will sit.346
The Netherlands tax regime at the time of the case at bar allowed sales of immovable
property to be immune from the VAT tax unless the sale of the building and/or the land on which
the building sat was involved in a transaction involving its sale within two years of the building’s
first occupation.347 Dutch law also stated that if improper use of the immovable property, such
as activity that would not allow for a full deduction of the VAT tax, the Dutch government was
allowed to apply an additional tax assessment to the seller.348
According to the ECJ, only the party that applied for the VAT tax deduction could be
subject to a member-state’s attempt to adjust the VAT tax amount pursuant to Article 20 of the
Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC.349 The ECJ further stated that it would go against the
purpose of the Sixth Council Directive by allowing an adjustment of VAT tax to be levied
against a party other than the party originally benefitting from the VAT tax deduction.350 More
narrowly, the ECJ contended that the Sixth Council Directive was designed to maintain the
341
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neutrality of the VAT tax and that any tax regime allowing another party to pay an amount
following an adjustment would compromise the VAT tax system.351
Additionally, the ECJ found that, although the Sixth Council Directive does allow
member-states some discretion when imposing the VAT tax, forcing a party to pay a VAT tax
adjustment would go beyond what is allowed under EU VAT law. Specific to the facts in the
case at bar, when the transaction between the supplier and Pactor Vastgoed took place, that
transaction was exempted from the VAT tax, and when the supplier applied for the VAT
deduction and received the deduction, any later adjustment must be assessed by the supplier and
at no time could the Netherlands government find that Pactor Vastgoed gained an “unjustified
advantage” pursuant to Article 20 of the Sixth Council Directive. 352 Furthermore, although
Decision 88/498/EEC allowed member-states to assess VAT tax against the purchaser of
immovable property, once the supplier became the recipient of the VAT deduction, only the
supplier could be assessed an adjustment.353
VI. DOMINANT THEMES
77/388/EEC.

FROM THE

ECJ’S DECISIONS CONCERNING SIXTH COUNCIL DIRECTIVE

There are four dominant themes reflected in the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the Sixth Council
Directive 77/388/EEC. First, the ECJ does not allow member-states to determine the parameters
of the VAT tax. According to the ECJ, member-states cannot use their inherent discretion
associated with Directive 77/388/EEC to limit the ability to take advantage of the VAT tax based
on the form of business organization chosen by the firm and whether or not profits are
realized.354 The ECJ went further in Ambulanter stating that member-states cannot condition the
use of the VAT tax deduction based on the form of business association, the location of the
organization’s services, or the reason for the services.355 The ECJ also held that member-states
cannot impede a firm’s use of the VAT tax deduction based on an arbitrary quantitative value
such as the amount of membership fees charged by a nonprofit organization.356
The ECJ’s decision in Commission v. Belgium explicitly stated that Belgium’s
derogations based on the price, use, and value of a car found in a pricing catalog to threaten the
VAT tax harmonization sought by the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC and also warned
member-states about government-identified price differences between imported and domestic
cars.357 Member-states are also not permitted to make available a VAT tax deduction based on a
judgment as to the quality of services rendered by an individual actor.358 In Werner Haderer, the
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ECJ made it clear that divisions based on whether a university course is of high level should not
dictate whether the economic actors should be entitled to a VAT tax deduction and such
divisions could threaten the EU-wide VAT tax system.359 Member-states must only extend
eligibility for the VAT tax deduction to those who have applied for the VAT tax deduction.360
Furthermore, in Pactor Vastgoed, the ECJ stated that when a member-state allows for
adjustments for VAT tax purposes to extend to parties other than those who have applied for the
deduction, the member-state exceeds the scope of EU law, and the VAT tax system should be
used by member-states in a way that does not allow for an unjustified advantage.361
In contrast to the above-mentioned cases on the point of member-state discretion on the
scope of the VAT tax, the ECJ did state that member-states can define the activity supporting the
claim that a VAT tax deduction is applicable.362 In Regie Dauphinoise, the ECJ held that
member-states can bar interest on clients’ accounts from a VAT tax assessment when the service
provider is believed to be trading for its own interest and not merely holding assets for clients.363
The second major theme from the ECJ’s jurisprudence is that the ECJ will not permit a
member-state to implement barriers in the form of additional administrative measures that will
interfere with access to VAT tax refunds. In Molenheide, the ECJ found in violation of the Sixth
Council Directive 77/388/EEC that a member-state’s preventive attachment system would
require a firm seeking a VAT tax deduction to engage in additional administrative efforts to gain
a VAT tax deduction since the preventive attachment itself created a presumption of
ineligibility.364 Although the ECJ did not find the preventive attachment system a per se
violation of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, the ECJ found Belgium’s approach to be
disproportionate to its interests because the system in effect created an irrebuttable presumption
against eligibility for a VAT tax deduction.365 Likewise, member-states cannot require economic
actors seeking a VAT tax refund to accept a government bond in lieu of either taking the
immediate deduction or carrying the deduction value forward.366 The ECJ made it clear that
VAT tax refunds should be immediate, liquid, and delivered in a reasonable amount of time.367
Concerning the principle that any excess administrative barriers to a VAT tax deduction
be prohibited, the ECJ in Ampliscientifica did allow a member-state to condition receipt of a
VAT tax deduction collectively as one taxable person on the requirement that a parent firm own
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50% of a subsidiary at the beginning of a taxable year, for which the ECJ found an allowable
derogation from the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC.368 However, in allowing this
derogation that seemingly interfered with the idea that no additional administrative barriers exist,
the ECJ put forth perhaps its best articulation of when derogations from the Sixth Council
Directive will be allowed.369 Specifically, the ECJ stated that such derogations will be allowed
when the member-state is treating similar goods and services in a similar manner (fiscal
neutrality), the member-state is attempting to prohibit special arrangements to avoid taxes (abuse
of rights), and the derogation is not excessive (proportionality).370
Third, the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the Sixth Council Directive reflects a willingness on
the part of the ECJ to allow for variations among member-states in their discretion so long as
there is no threat to harmonization of VAT tax law. In Institute of the Motor Industry, the ECJ
demanded that member-states not allow linguistic differences to alter VAT tax law that would
allow for intolerable interference with harmonization.371 However, due to a perceived lack of
threat to VAT tax harmonization in SUFA, the ECJ upheld the denial of a VAT tax exemption to
a nonprofit organization that was supplying services to another nonprofit organization.372
The Jetair NV case is perhaps the best articulation of the ECJ’s willingness to show
flexibility in the face of the need for harmonization while also showing that flexibility and
harmonization can work together. Here, the ECJ stated that member-states can alter deadlines
for economic actors, specifically setting such deadlines earlier for VAT tax purposes in order to
get parties to act in a way that forces them to engage in activities that lead to harmonization
earlier than required even if member-states would have differing deadlines for a limited time
period.373 Also specific to the Jetair NV case, the ECJ held that member-states can continue to
tax activities outside the EU so long as there is no risk to harmonization and the EU has not
created a definitive system through legislative action on the subject matter of the member-state’s
tax.374
Lastly, the ECJ has drafted opinions concerning the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC
that allow for high levels of efficiency leading to the avoidance of trade distortion and tax
evasion. In Skripalle, the ECJ commented that derogations from the language in Directive
77/388/EEC must be strictly construed and that tax evasion is likely to contribute to an allowable
derogation while a member-state’s need for simplicity in calculation is not.375 In X BV, the ECJ
made it clear that the thrust of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC is to make the transfer of
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assets easier and distinguish transfer of shares from transfer of assets while allowing memberstates to decide when a VAT tax deduction should apply to a particular transaction involving the
sale of shares by granting the freedom to decide what is an independent activity. 376 Similar to
the difficult distinction between a sale of shares and a sale of assets, the ECJ gave member-states
the ability to tax a larger good at one VAT tax rate even when smaller goods included within the
larger good and those smaller goods are taxed at a different VAT tax rate. 377 The ECJ also held
that there must be a link between the VAT tax deduction claim and the taxable activities
supporting the claim.378
Perhaps the best example of an ECJ decision that promoted efficiency is found in the
Navicon SA decision holding that a member-state cannot condition the availability of a VAT tax
exemption on the requirement that an exporter of goods charter an entire cargo capacity of a
vessel.379 According to the ECJ, to do otherwise would lead to a condition whereby the VAT tax
system is not living up to the intent of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC. 380 Additionally,
the ECJ also remarked in Navicon SA that domestic law cannot interfere with the objectives of
Directive 77/388/EEC.381 In Zita Modes, the ECJ claimed that member-states do have the
flexibility to exclude the sale of goods from the total sale of assets that would otherwise be taxed
through the VAT tax regime so long as distortion in competition does not exist.382 More
narrowly, the ECJ commented that the prohibition on trade distortion practices will protect
harmonization and prevent divergence among the member-states.383
There are, however, two cases cited in this work that could allow for trade distortions
and/or tax avoidance. In Gil Insurance, the ECJ let stand additional taxes that could be applied
to the same transaction that would be covered by the VAT tax system but only so long as the
additional taxes are not turnover taxes, the additional taxes do not interfere with cross-border
trade among the member-states, and the additional taxes do not alter the final tax amount at the
final stage of consumption.384 According to the ECJ, these additional taxes could be
implemented by a member-state even if the tax rate does not match the VAT tax rate and even if
the additional tax was not applied at the same point in the stream of commerce as the VAT
tax.385 Furthermore, member-states need not acquire permission from the EU government to
376
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levy the additional taxes.386 Similarly, in Kerrutt, the ECJ stated that member-states can
implement additional taxes on the same transaction covered by the VAT tax regime even if it
leads to double taxation of that transaction.387
VII. THE EFFECTIVENESS
HARMONIZATION

OF

DIRECTIVE 77/388/EEC: THE POTENTIAL THREATS

TO

Despite the above-mentioned dominant themes found in the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the
Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, several threats exist to the mission of VAT tax
harmonization throughout the EU. The first lies with the ECJ’s position that, at least in some
cases, the national courts of member-states should maintain some discretion. For example, in
Midland, after deciding that there needs to be an immediate link between a transaction and the
claim for a VAT tax deduction, the ECJ held that national courts can decide whether this link
exists.388 The ECJ’s decision that an immediate link must exist between the transaction and the
claim would seemingly create a strong prophylactic against tax evasion, yet the decision
threatens harmonization as each member-state court decides the same question differently. If
such discretion is left to the national courts of the member-states, taxable persons and entities
will likely move their activities to member-states that maintain the most flexible rules on whether
an immediate link exists. Clearly, this is not what the Framers of the Sixth Council Directive
77/388/EEC had envisioned. Member-states, in order to attract investment would have an
incentive to create very flexible rules creating a weak link between the transaction and the VAT
tax deduction claim. At worst, the only penalty for doing so is facing a complaint by a private
party or the EU Commission followed by potentially lengthy litigation whereby the best result
would be a favorable ECJ decision granting discretion. This reality, in turn, would cause a race
to the bottom leading to an evaporation of the revenue the member-state governments could use
to reinvest in their countries.
In Commission v. Italy, the ECJ firmly held that member-states cannot demand that
taxable persons hold bonds in lieu of immediate VAT tax refunds, but still left the question of
whether an additional requirement or non-cash refunds was proportionate to member-states’
needs in the face of Directive 77/388/EEC to the national courts in Molenheide.389 However,
after digesting the opinions in Commission v. Italy and Molenheide, if a member-state
government realizes that it cannot force a VAT tax refund declarant to hold a bond, the memberstate may believe that less onerous, yet more proportionate methods of providing VAT tax
refunds may pass ECJ muster if the national court provides an approval. Likewise, in EGI, the
ECJ stated that member-states cannot insist on additional, burdensome administrative
requirements in order for a taxable person to gain a VAT tax refund, yet still gave member-state
courts the discretion to determine what might be an overly burdensome requirement that might
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interfere with the thrust of Directive 77/388/EEC.390 The ECJ also left the decision as to whether
a firm’s consulting services are part of the firm’s overall economic activity for the purposes of
the VAT tax regime when the consulting services are related to the sale of shares in X BV.391
In the above cases on the subject mediums for VAT tax refunds, administrative
requirements, and measuring the value of consulting services, the ECJ has opened the door to
greater discretion among member-states and their national courts that could lead to greater
differences among the member-states about the VAT tax regime, which puts VAT tax
harmonization in jeopardy. Member-states will certainly have the ability and incentive to
experiment within the range of flexibility provided to them by the ECJ’s jurisprudence.
Relatedly, the ability of member-states to engage in double taxation and/or assess
additional taxes on the same transaction poses a threat to overall harmonization of taxes across
the EU even if the threat to VAT tax harmonization does not exist. The Gil Insurance case is
perhaps the best example of such a threat. If a member-state is allowed to apply additional taxes
to a transaction already covered by the VAT tax regime, the total tax amount of that transaction
can increase substantially. In Kerrutt, the ECJ went as far as to state that the Sixth Council
Directive does not prohibit double taxation of transactions subject to the VAT tax system.392
Such increased tax levels could lead to the movement of the production of goods and services to
other member-states that merely maintain a traditional VAT tax on the transaction. Although
member-states are not likely to tax merchants and producers to the point that exodus from the
original member-state is a likely option due to concerns over the loss of any tax revenue, the
threat to tax harmonization still exists.
In addition, the judicial debate on these issues is too time consuming. One could
potentially think that the standards espoused by the various ECJ decisions cited in this work,
including the requirement of fiscal neutrality and proportionality, would serve as adequate
safeguards. There simply exists too much flexibility on the part of the member-state about
whether fiscal neutrality is met and, likewise, whether a member-state’s legislation is
proportional. Relatedly, the adoption of later Council Directives such as 95/7/EC and
2006/112/EC, which also allow for member-state discretion, do not force member-states toward
harmonization but rather serve as guidelines as to how to get to a condition of harmony regarding
the VAT tax.
Put bluntly, the various threats to harmonization of the VAT tax regime in the EU under
the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC could be solved either by replacing the Directive with a
Regulation or the end of the ECJ’s jurisprudential practice of allowing member-state national
courts to maintain discretion, or preferably both. As stated above, a Regulation is different from
a Directive in that a Regulation does not provide member-states with the discretion to pass
legislation to meet the intent of EU legislation; rather, it is directly effective on member-states
without implementing domestic legislation. Therefore, if EU law on the VAT tax were to be
recrafted in the form of a Regulation, EU-wide VAT tax law would be much more harmonious.
Likewise, if the ECJ left in place its black letter law holdings without providing an escape hatch
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for member-states in the form of national court discretion, EU-wide VAT tax law would be
further strengthened. The ECJ’s decision in Jetair is a terrific example of this reality. In Jetair,
the ECJ stated that EU law tolerates differences in domestic law across the member-states so
long as EU legislatures have not created a definitive legal regime on the subject matter at
issue.393
Part of the responsibility of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC is to foster the crossborder movement of goods. As stated above, the ECJ is responsible for making sure the 28
member-states follow EU law. The flexibility noted above places the common market in
jeopardy and increases the threat of tax avoidance. Given the various threats to harmonization of
VAT tax law across the EU, now is the time for greater legislative and judicial activism. The
efforts of the European Commission are limited to bringing complaints against member-states for
non-compliance with Directive 77/388/EEC. Such use of this branch of EU government is not an
efficient or effective means by which to bring legislative activism to promote harmonization of
the VAT tax system through the replacement of Directive 77/388/EEC with a Regulation that
would remove part of the discretion the member-states have in regard to the VAT tax through the
adoption of implementing law. The use of a Regulation would foreclose the problem identified
in Jetair as the EU legislatures would have created a legal regime that ends much of the memberstate discretion threatening harmonization. Judicial activism could come in the form of a series
of ECJ decisions removing leeway from the member-states especially about leaving some
decisions to national courts. This two-part approach, the replacement of a Directive with a
Regulation and the removal of flexibility within the national courts, should serve as forceful
means by which to further harmonize VAT tax law across the EU’s 28 tax jurisdictions. It should
also be noted that the adoption of a Regulation would immediately implement a harmonized
VAT tax law without waiting for the 18-24 month implementation period. Further, the EU
government would spend fewer resources on tax compliance.
The threats identified here can be a chief barrier not only to the harmonization of VAT
tax law across the EU, but also to further integration of the EU. Such interference with
integration can harm the EU’s global competitiveness as global firms curb their investment in a
region that maintains uncertainty. In contrast, greater reliability brought on by the use of a
Regulation and less national court discretion would make the EU business environment more
competitive. A greater level of uniformity would also stabilize the accounting challenges
associated with a 28-member EU. One of the chief advantages of the VAT tax was that the total
value added at each stage of production or distribution was equal to the total income earned. If
uncertainty is allowed to continue or worsen through increased legislative and judicial discretion
at the member-state level, the values associated with the VAT tax could become less certain. In
other words, the “total value added” for the same good and the same transaction in one memberstate could be different in another member-state. Such value differences could lead to
accounting difficulties and investment uncertainty. Perhaps the Zita Modes case, in which the
ECJ gave member-states the discretion to use the no supply of goods rule, is the best example of
this reality.394
A list of threats to harmonization is not to say that the ECJ has not done some admirable
work on the issue of VAT tax harmonization. The decisions in Kennemer Golf and Ambulater
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gave firms the freedom to choose, without VAT tax discrimination, the form of business
association that will best fit their needs which, presumably, would be the most efficient form of
business association.395
VIII. CONCLUSION
The vision of the Framers of the Treaty of Rome was to create an “ever-closer union”
among the member-states that would later constitute the EU.396 Following a 2016 referendum,
the United Kingdom is scheduled to leave the EU on March 29, 2019.397 One of the chief
concerns associated with the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU is the impact on financial
markets.398 The void left by the United Kingdom’s contributions to the EU government’s budget
could be substantial.399 One estimate of this tax deficit is between €10-15 billion per year that
must be absorbed by the remaining 27 member-states.400 The risk to international trade has been
perceived as so great that just before the June 2016 referendum, nearly one-third of the largest
firms in the United Kingdom banded together to make clear that the best future for the United
Kingdom requires that it remain with the EU.401 Regardless of the impact on the EU budget, the
negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EU are in a very uncertain state because much
international trade is threatened by the mere lack of agreement about what is to happen after
March 29, 2019.402 Interestingly enough, the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU could
give it an advantage in the war to attract large businesses as the United Kingdom would no
longer have the restraints imposed by EU tax law.403
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The uncertainty posed by the threat of a United Kingdom exit from the EU is akin to the
uncertainty the ECJ, and the EU government in general, leaves open by collectively allowing for
member-state discretion in determining what implementing legislation can be used to meet the
requirements of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, allowing national courts to determine
what member-state implementing legislation meets the requirements of Directive 77/388/EEC,
and using a Directive instead of a Regulation to harmonize VAT tax law across the EU.
The level of VAT tax harmonization that exists in the EU should be described as fragile
with a few sources of threat. Although this work recommends transplanting a Directive with a
Regulation, the author of this work admits that perhaps the flexibility of a Directive is what
keeps many member-states in the EU, whereas the adoption of more Regulations may lead to
further referendums by member-state polities as to whether to remain in the common market.
However, not one member-state has left the EU since its founding.

